Political scientists make heavy use of census statistics but have given scant attention to the politics behind the production of those statistics. Key issues that merit analytic attention by political science include vote dilution, the policy of population growth and composition, distributional accuracy and census undercounts, the establishment of statistical races, the color-blind challenge to the ethnoracial classification, the political independence of federal statistics, the important distinction between the scientific production and the political use of the census and other statistical products, public concern about government intrusiveness, and the shift from survey and census data to administrative and digital data.
INTRODUCTION
Any political scientist knows the basics: Every ten years the government takes a population census; this census counts the resident population and maps its geographic distribution; these counts are used to reapportion the House of Representatives, and as a byproduct determine Electoral College voting strength across the states. States use the counts to draw congressional district lines, state legislature districts, and such other electoral units as their respective laws require.
If every political scientist knows the basics, few can answer even rudimentary questions about the decennial census itself. What determines who is counted and where? What political considerations govern how the census is taken? How independent is the census of political influence? Although the electoral use of census results is closely studied by political scientists, the production of the census counts is not. Largely missing from political science is theoretical work on the political sociology of census taking.
This article does not follow traditional literature review practice. The research literature is too thin for such treatment. It is, instead, organized in terms of questions and issues that would benefit from attention by political scientists.
THE FOUNDING: TASKS ASSIGNED TO THE DECENNIAL CENSUS
A census itself was not new in 1790. The archaic definition of census is "poll tax," indicating its early association with the state's interest in revenue extraction; other early purposes were conscription and surveillance. These premodern state control functions continue into the present, but the modern census also has the "primary and manifest function [of] the production of quantitative information" (Starr 1987, p. 11) .
In American history, this quantitative information was made a constitutional obligation in order to establish a republic based on principles of representation. The census was instituted as and remains a tool to organize government. When the framers wrote a decennial census into the Constitution, they had in mind two challenges special to the establishment of a republic at the edge of a vast, sparsely populated continent: (a) how to establish a government based on federalism; (b) how to avoid the dangers of colonialism.
The founders "took the idea of federalism, which had never worked successfully, solved its most complex problem of the distribution of powers . . . , and created the first successful and enduring federal government" (Commager 1975, p. 21) . Separating law-making powers between the two legislative houses, the Senate based on equal representation for each state and the House based on representation proportional to population size, was key to this success, and could not be implemented without determining the respective numbers for each of the proposed 13 new states. Hence the first census of 1790.
But why a census every ten years? Its intent was to solve the problem of colonialism that, since the Greek city-states, had undermined efforts to establish a republic. A colonial power could not also be a republic. In treating some of its subjects as noncitizens without rights, colonial rule contradicts the basic premise of a republic. (Slavery, the colonization of group within the state, was of course also incompatible with the idea of a republic, as the framers well understood but sidestepped by treating slaves as property rather than as people.)
The new American nation was especially susceptible to the temptations of colonialism; rich and sparsely settled lands lay just beyond the Alleghenies. Many in the founding generation imagined a nation stretching to the Pacific. This vision posed a constitutional question: Were the western territories to enter the Union as colonies subject to the control of the Atlantic States or as free and independent states? Gourverneur Morris argued the former, pleading that "the rule of representation ought to be so fixed as to secure to the Atlantic States a prevalence in the National Councils" (quoted by Morgan 1977, p. 139) . Delegates from the small states advanced a counterargument, recognizing that the dominance of the large-population eastern states could be checked by the steady admission to the Union of western territories. Their argument prevailed. The framers assigned to the census its second significant nation-building task: to measure not only the growth of the population but also its westward movement and thereby regulate the pace at which the territories became the new states. The Constitution set the American experiment apart from Britain's failure as an empire by insisting on equal rights for all the territories that were to join the Union as states (Onuf 2000, p. 38) .
From an even broader perspective, America's nation-building census was a radical break from British colonial practice. The latter belongs to what Starr (1987, p. 12 ) describes as premodern census taking, which presumes a "coercive relation between a state and its subjects." The modern census, in contrast, presumes a "cooperative relation between a state and its citizens." America's census taking did not fully distance itself from coercive policies, but Starr is right to emphasize a basic shift that occurs in the early nation-building periodnot only in American political history but also across Europe in the nineteenth century, as new nations found in the census a tool relevant to establishing liberal democracies.
In the American experience, however, the nineteenth-century experiment in democratic nation building was compromised by the simultaneous acceptance of a racist social order-and in this the census was also centrally implicated.
THE EARLY CENSUS
The design of the census was in the hands of the First Congress. James Madison wanted an expansive census, recommending that occupations of the adult male population be recorded. He noted that "to accommodate our laws to the real situation of our constituents, we ought to be acquainted with that situation" (quoted by Cohen 1982, p. 160) . His colleagues rejected the idea.
This early debate about what to include in the first census points to a large truth. Any census is about classification as much as it is about counting. The categories made explicit in classifications are never politically neutral. The congressional majority opposing a question on occupations felt that determining the relative size of different economic interests "conflicted with the traditional principle of a common good that embraced the entire community" (Cohen 1982, p. 163) . In contrast to the occupation classification, a racial classification scheme was readily adopted in the first census, and no census since has been without it.
THE THREE-FIFTHS CLAUSE AND OTHER VOTE DILUTIONS
By the time the Constitution was written, natural law, colonial practice, and prevailing science had drawn lines of racial distinction that led to unquestioned racial counting in the nation's first census. Race numbers immediately entered the policy process and have been securely lodged there since.
Southern interests wanted the slave count included in apportionment numbers, thus to increase southern power in Congress and in the Electoral College. Northern interests resisted this distortion of the principles of representation. The compromise was to count each slave as three-fifths of a person. The consequences were enormous. The slave-holding states gained one third more congressional places than were warranted by the size of their free population-"forty-seven seats instead of thirty-three in 1793." This slave bonus was repeated every ten years-"seventy-six instead of fifty-nine in 1812, and ninety-eight instead of seventy-three in 1833" (Wills 2003, p. 6) .
Additional seats in Congress translated into additional votes in the Electoral College. These 13 extra electoral votes were the margin of victory in Jefferson's election to the presidency, and the bonus favored Southern slaveholder presidential candidates for decades to come.
All told, in the 62 years from the election of Washington to 1850, the White House was home to slave-owners for a total of 50 years.
The basic principle of democratic representation is the allocation of political power proportionate to population size. It is, however, fairly easy to distort this principle by rules that dilute voting power. The three-fifths clause diluted the voting power of free citizens in the North by increasing the voting power of slaveowning citizens in the South. For purposes of apportioning power, the Massachusetts farmer is counted once and the Virginian with 100 slaves is counted 61 times.
The three-fifths clause was not the only instance of vote dilution written into the Constitution. Today Wyoming, the least populated state at just under a half million, has two senators; so does California, with its nearly 34 million residents. With respect to powers exercised by the Senate-declaration of war, ratification of treaties, appointment of Supreme Court justices-the California voter's influence is diluted by a factor of 68 to 1.
This undemocratic feature of the Constitution is well known, but for all practical purposes it is beyond reform. To change it requires amending the Constitution; amendment, however, can be blocked by any 13 states. If, on the matter of unequal representation in the Senate, the smallest 13 states with the most to lose oppose an amendment, 5% of the population would in effect veto the preferences of 95%. Dahl (2002, p. 154) , after examining the dismal impact of the Connecticut compromise on American democracy, offers little hope of reform: "The likelihood of reducing the extreme inequality of representation in the Senate is virtually zero" (italics in original).
The contemporary debate is whether to include noncitizens in the apportionment numbers-an issue that has occasioned a proposed amendment to the Constitution as well as a legislative effort to insist that the 2010 census exclude noncitizens. Vote dilution is again the rationale. Excluding noncitizens would, for example, have cost California five congressional seats following the 2000 census.
Neither the amendment nor the legislation prevailed, although the latter narrowly failed, in a strict party-line vote, when the cloture rule was invoked.
Federalism, avoiding colonization, and the compromise over slavery were all instrumental to the nation-building task that followed independence. All were dependent on the census. In the first two instances, the census helped to establish a republican form of government; in the third instance, it helped to establish racial nationalism (Smith 1997).
POPULATION POLICY
Other issues from the founding period fall under the headings of population growth and population composition, and they too have contemporary expression.
Population Growth
Population growth was political well before independence. In the litany of grievances Jefferson composed for the Declaration of Independence, he found King George III guilty of suppressing population growth. In this formulation, much more is at stake than the right of the colonies to grow in size. The "right to leave" England challenges the notion that those born under the Crown owe it their lifetime allegiance.
Jefferson invoked this radical idea in "A Summary View of the Rights of British America" (1774), a prelude to the Declaration. He builds on it to assert that allegiance is a matter of consent. That which is based on consent can be withdrawn if the conditions under which consent was granted are changed. Although the "right to leave" as a justification for rebellion did not survive the congressional editing that led to the final wording in the Declaration, Jefferson continued to believe that the argument carried weight, and it more generally "contributed significantly to the formation of the revolutionary outlook" (Zolberg 2006, p. 49) .
If population policy played a part in justifying the War of Independence, actual population numbers gave confidence to the revolutionary leaders, at least if they believed their own wartime propaganda. They "used demographic data to show that the infant United States had a large and growing population and could withstand war with England for many years." In contrast, "English commentators feared that their population was either stationary or declining" (Anderson 1988, p. 11) .
Population growth mattered for reasons beyond war readiness or tax capacity. American enlightenment thinking echoed Rousseau's claim that "the most certain sign" of the prosperity of a political association and its members "is the number and increase of population" (quoted by Commager 1975, p. 27 ). This reasoning was not uncommon in early American political theory. As summarized by Commager, "a population which flourished and increased was both a product of and a tribute to the blessings which America enjoyedblessings not only of Nature, but of government, economy, and society" (Commager 1975, p. 46) .
If population growth mattered, so did the composition of America's new population. Along with growth, the politics of composition contributed to the drive for independence.
Population Composition
To design a nation, as Zolberg (2006) puts it, includes taking actions to influence not just the size but the distribution and composition of a nation's population.
Britain's colonial empire was America's teacher in this regard. Britain exported its vagrants, religious dissidents, and criminals to the American colonies. What made sense for the British did not make sense for Americans, who were adamant about keeping out criminals and the poor while attracting law-abiding, productive workers. At stake in this dispute was the question of what the colonies represented. For the British, the colonies were a revenue source-"economic undertakings, whose social, racial, or national makeup did not matter unless it occasioned problems of economic management or of external security." For Americans, the colonies were the first step in an ambitious civic project; they were to be understood as "communities in the making" that might aspire to independence. Committed to this civic project, America's leaders feared that too much heterogeneity in the population of the colonies "might be a source of conflict and possibly lead to disintegration, the more so if they were to be assembled into a single political entity" (Zolberg 2006, p. 40) .
A growing population of farmers, fighters, explorers, tradesmen, and settlers was needed for the tasks ahead. It was preferable if growth occurred through natural fertility, but a managed immigration policy could be deployed as needed-with the census serving to track the numbers.
On the eve of the Revolution, then, there was general acceptance that a government could and should manipulate the size and composition of its population, whether to advance economic growth or in pursuit of broader civic goals. From this starting point, the significance of the census (and related survey data) in governing has steadily increased. Desire to attract the "right kind of immigrants" has, of course, been a constant in American history. The restrictive immigration laws of the 1920s were targeted at Polish Jews and Italian Catholics. Today there is concern about "too many" Mexican laborers, but a simultaneous effort to attract software engineers from India and nurses from the Philippines. Similar efforts occur in nearly every nation. Israel is importing orthodox Jews as part of its effort to establish land settlements in Palestinian territories; Europe is experimenting with "replacement migration" in an effort to maintain an age-balanced population in the face of declining fertility; Singapore has grudgingly come to terms with its low fertility and is becoming more immigrant friendly.
In all such efforts, reliable demographic statistics are needed. A political sociology of population size and composition would do well to pay more attention to what is behind the construction of those statistics.
THE POLITICS OF PROPORTIONALITY
Apportionment, the first and most enduring purpose of U.S. census taking, is based on statistical proportionality. This places a premium on being included in the census, even on being overcounted. The founders were alert to this temptation and tried to check it with an incentive to under-report. They based not only apportionment but also taxation on census counts. Evidence on whether the effort to minimize bias worked is in short supply, and was in any case no longer relevant after the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. But the political concern about distortions in the census numbers as a consequence of under-or overcounting never disappeared.
In the latter decades of the twentieth century, the undercount issue drew serious technical attention as well as an intensely partisan battle. We review this under the heading of distributional accuracy, distinguishing that concept from the more familiar term, numerical accuracy.
DISTRIBUTIONAL ACCURACY
The Director of the Census Bureau announced in December 2000 that there were 281,421,906 persons resident in the United States on census day, April 1. Numerical accuracy is commonly understood as how close that number was to the true number of persons resident on census day, or more generally, how close the count of a given jurisdiction is to its true size. After the 2000 census, several hundred jurisdictions around the country filed complaints that their census count was too low. None complained that it was too high.
1
Numerical accuracy in census taking is a challenge, but the more difficult technical 1 Complaints are adjudicated through a Count Question Resolution program, which after the 2000 census reviewed 461 complaints (or about 1% of the 39,000 civil jurisdictions in the country). Most problems can be traced to faulty addresses, and adjustments are made. When there is no evidence of a mistake, the jurisdiction has to accept the Census Bureau's count.
challenges and political battles revolve around distributional accuracy-the proportional distribution of the population by geography or population groups.
A census can be numerically inaccurate but still achieve distributional accuracy. If the census misses the same percentage of the population in every state, then each state will receive the number of congressional representatives it would had the census counted 100% of the population. But if the percentage of errors differs from one state to the next there is distributional inaccuracy. The census is judged unfair.
No census is a complete count of the population. President George Washington complained about the nation's first census. "One thing is certain," he insisted, "our real numbers will exceed, greatly, the official returns of them" (The Writings of George Washington 1939, p. 329) . Every president since could offer the same complaint. Censuses are plagued by an undercount. A moment's reflection will suggest why. There is only one census. To what, then, could it be compared to determine how complete it was? To reliably assess census accuracy would require two population counts so the results of one could be used to check the other. Historically this would have been prohibitively expensive. Not until the mid-twentieth century was statistical theory sufficiently advanced to estimate the magnitude and distribution of the undercount.
There was an unplanned opportunity to compare the 1940 American census with an independent and complete count of at least one major population group-males between the ages of 21 and 35. Though hardly its intent, the universal military registration following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 gave statisticians a second, independent estimate of young males. Comparing these two numbers provided the first reliable measure of how many persons, at least among young males, were missed in the 1940 census. It was about 3%, a finding that initially concerned a small circle of statisticians and demographers working on census accuracy. From this starting point, a way to estimate the census undercount for both genders and all age groups was developed. Labeled demographic analysis, it is, in theory, simple. It starts with a basic population number derived from the prior census, and then, using vital statistics and other administrative records, updates it by adding every birth and every arriving immigrant, and subtracting every death and every person who moves out of the country. Allowances are made for imprecise estimates of immigration, especially the probable number of undocumented residents, and the estimates of out-migration, on which records are incomplete.
Comparing the demographic analysis estimate with the decennial census count provided a national net undercount number each decade ( Table 1) . The net undercount is the difference between those missed and those counted more than once, and the strikingly low net undercount in 2000, and to a lesser extent in 1980, is attributable to unusually high duplicate responses or overcounts.
THE POLITICS OF THE DIFFERENTIAL UNDERCOUNT
The political implication of census undercounts comes into focus because the undercount is not proportionately distributed across all population groups. For example, even as the national net undercount decreased across the second half of the twentieth century, there stubbornly remained the fact that black households were undercounted at consistently higher rates than nonblack households-by ∼4% at every decennial.
The consequences of this differential undercount were noted as early as the 1960s, at the height of the civil rights movement. Daniel Patrick Moynihan was the guiding hand behind a Conference on Social Statistics and the City that drew the obvious implication:
Where a group defined by racial or ethnic terms, and concentrated in special political jurisdictions, is significantly undercounted in relation to other groups, then individual members of that group are thereby deprived of the constitutional right to equal representation in the House of Representatives and, by inference, in other legislative bodies. They are also deprived of their entitlement to partake in federal and other programs designed for areas and populations with their characteristics.
In other words, miscounting the population could unconstitutionally deny minorities political representation or protection under the Voting Rights Act. It could also deny local jurisdictions grant funds from federal programs. (Heer 1968, p. 11) A technical problem in census taking, the undercount, moved quickly into the fractious politics of racial justice. The Census Bureau came under enormous pressure to fix the differential undercount.
Although demographic analysis could document the inequity in census numbers, it was not a method that could fix it. Demographic analysis provides a national estimate of the undercount, but the consequences play out at local levels-where congressional districts are drawn and federal funds are allocated. The census needed a more sophisticated statistical method if it was to fix the undercount problem.
Dual-system estimation, in which the census is immediately followed by a completely independent large-sample survey, became the favored method. If correctly done, the sample survey offers a second population count that is compared with the census and that can allow adjustment-block by block-to align the census number with the "true" number of people in the country (Wight & Hogan 1999, pp. 11-19) . Starting in 1950, the method was steadily improved from one census to the next, but not until 1990 did the Census Bureau believe that it could be applied to adjust the undercount.
In that year, however, the bureau was under court order to present its decision regarding census adjustment to the Secretary of Commerce. The Director of the Census Bureau recommended adjustment, but she was overruled by the Secretary. He offered technical objections but also included this political reasoning: For a high government official to charge that the Census Bureau might choose a datacollection method in order to favor one political party over another was unprecedented. The Secretary was careful to say that it could happen and not that it had, but in the highly charged political atmosphere, cautionary language was quickly discarded. Partisan polarization reached new highs after the Republican Party gained control of the House of Representatives in 1994; it had control during the entire period in which the 2000 census was being planned.
As inevitable as it was unfortunate, census design became a target of partisan animosities. Statistical adjustment, often though inaccurately reduced to the label "sampling," became a political target. Congressional Republicans who reviewed the census plans and appropriated funds were told that allowing the census to be adjusted would have a "negative effect in the partisan makeup of 24 Congressional seats, 113 State Senate seats and 297 State House seats nationwide . . ." (Nicholson 1997) .
The Congressional Black Caucus-all Democrats-took up the census as a leading civil rights issue, and they were often joined by Hispanic and Asian members of Congress. A civil rights coalition, with 180 member organizations, framed the issue: "Because the accuracy of the census directly affects our nation's ability to ensure equal representation and equal access to important governmental resources for all Americans, ensuring a fair and accurate census must be regarded as one of the most significant civil rights and equal rights issues facing the country today" (Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 2000).
Census methodology collided with partisan interests. Both sides dressed their arguments in high-minded language. Democrats spoke of fairness; Republicans cited the constitutional provision that an "actual enumeration" be taken as reason to reject any plan using sampling. Both sides found support among reputable statisticians (Lawrence et al. 1999 , Darga 1999 , Citro et al. 2004 .
The issue was adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which ruled on statutory, not constitutional, grounds that census adjustment could not be used in determining the 2000 apportionment numbers. This left unresolved whether the 2000 census could produce adjusted numbers for congressional redistricting and federal fund allocation. In 2001, technical work at the Census Bureau discovered serious problems with the results of dual-system estimation as applied in 2000. The bureau concluded that adjustment would introduce more error than it removed, and decided not to release any data products based on the dual-system estimation analysis.
Moving beyond the immediate politics and technical issues in the 2000 census, there are two very consequential issues for political science: the political independence of the decennial census and the racialization of census numbers.
INDEPENDENCE OF STATISTICS FROM POLITICS
The decennial census is inherently political. As an institution of the government that allocates power and public funds, it could not be otherwise. The theoretically important issue is in what ways the census is political. The distinction between the production of census counts and the use of the counts is critical. An historical example illustrates the distinction.
When the 1920 census apportionment numbers indicated that eight northern urban states would gain congressional seats (11 altogether) at the expense of ten southern and western rural states, a conservative coalition in Congress stalemated the reapportionment process for a decade. For this coalition, reapportionment meant transferring power to immigrants, trade unions, and socialists. For the only time in American history, a census did not shift power from the comparatively slow-growing or shrinking regions of the country to the rapidly growing regions.
This could be described as politicization of the census, as could numerous other events in census history. I emphasize, however, that the 1920 politics concerned the use of census numbers, not their production. In assessing the independence of the census, this distinction matters. The principles and practices of statistical agencies, as codified by the National Research Council in 2008, describe in detail what is necessary to protect census independence. The framers of these principles did not question that statistical products will be used, perhaps even misused, in political and policy processes. The premise is that their production must be solely under the control of a nonpartisan, professional agency and must adhere to the highest available statistical standards.
This principle has been at risk in the decades-long partisan battle over dual-system estimation. In the history of official government statistics on the economy, employment, education, military preparedness, health, and multiple other conditions, no statistical method save this one has been attacked as unconstitutional, generated a steady stream of party-line votes and presidential vetoes, and led political appointees to override the judgment of the census professionals.
Why is it only adjustment methods, and not other statistical procedures, that have so exercised the political process? Adjustment is not the only statistical procedure that affects the final census results and consequently influences where electoral boundaries are drawn. For example, in the 2000 census, imputation increased the final population count by 1.1 million, or about a half percent. Another quality-control procedure with similar ramifications was the removal of suspected duplicates from the census. In 2000, the number of cases added to the census through imputation and deduplication was greater than the number at stake in the statistical-adjustment battle.
The reason that two significant statistical procedures were left to the discretion of professionals while adjustment became politically charged can be traced to the 1980 census. Following that census, Democratic mayors from large cities sued the Census Bureau to force it to use the adjustment method despite the bureau's judgment that this would introduce more error than it would remove. The New York District Court of New York ruled in favor of the Census Bureau but instructed the bureau to continue working on dual-system estimation in anticipation of applying it in 1990. This was census taking by litigation. In the unfortunate language used by the Secretary of Commerce after the 1990 census, when he opined that the adjustment method could lend itself to manipulation for partisan advantage (see above), "sampling" became political ideology, for both parties.
In early 2001, following the inauguration of President George Bush, one of the first acts of his newly installed Secretary of Commerce was to announce that he would make the final decision about statistical adjustment and would call upon advice from statistical consultants of his choice. The Secretary treated the results differently from every other major statistic product produced by the federal government; he asserted his political right to make the final decision.
The ramifications of this extraordinary assertion are clear if we again consider how the initial census results for apportionment were reported. They were under the sole control of the Census Bureau. If it had been otherwise, if in December of 2000 the Democratic Secretary of Commerce had asserted his authority to review the state-by-state apportionment counts before they were announced, had brought in his own experts, and had then decided whether to allow the imputation or deduplication methodology, there would have been a political firestorm. It was not even considered (Prewitt 2003, p. 33) .
Nor has interference like this ever been attempted with other key statistics. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does not first show its unemployment rate to the Secretary of Labor, and then defer to his or her political judgment about what method should be used to calculate it. Should that happen, public confidence in this vital number would be shaken.
But the politics surrounding census adjustment has taken on a life of its own. As the 2010 census approached, it was not even possible, despite huge escalation in costs ($15 billion compared to $6.5 billion in 2000), to rationally examine whether some form of sampling might provide a more distributionally accurate census at a more efficient price.
IS RACE THE ISSUE?
Households are not missed in the census because they are black or Hispanic. They are missed where the Census Bureau's address file has errors; where the household is made up of unrelated persons; where household members are seldom at home; where there is a low sense of civic responsibility and perhaps an active distrust of the government; where occupants have lived but a short time and will move again; where English is not spoken; where community ties are not strong. Race was shorthand for many household characteristics that themselves were not racial. The decades-long partisan battle over census methodology need not have been about race at all.
The first reasonable estimate of the differential undercount had a racial dimension only because the draft system set up in 1941 recorded the race of every registrant. Birth and death records also record race. When statisticians used these vital statistics in demographic analysis, they had easily at hand a racial breakdown. From that time on, the undercount was always discussed as if it were about race. Calculating the undercount could not be based, for example, on a measure of social isolation or of linguistic barriers to completing a census form. Those measures are not available in the vital statistics on which demographic analysis is based.
Shifting to the statistical method of dualsystem estimation continued the practice, and again for reasons that were a byproduct of other considerations. Dual-system estimation relies on census counts at the block level, and these are available only from questions that are asked about every household in the decennial census. Very few questions are asked-including age, gender, and the race and Hispanic-ethnicity questions. This information is required by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which is administered using block-level counts of the voting-age population broken down by gender, race, and ethnicity.
There are many other household characteristics that might offer better predictors of census coverage than does race-language skills of household members, length of time in the country, education and income levels, marital status, or whether there are other family members living nearby (Hillygus et al. 2006) . If the census form included questions on these characteristics but not race, dual-system estimation would still have been possible. It might even have been statistically superior to the heavy reliance on the race variable.
I offer the example of census adjustment to emphasize that in the policy and political world, what is easily available is what is used-even if, on close inspection, it is poorly matched to the task at hand. In the 1960s, what was available to the government-the number of blacks in the labor pool and the number of blacks who got jobs in the construction industry-became the foundation of affirmative action. This made sense. Affirmative action was a policy designed to end racial discrimination and improve employment of racial minorities. It was about race.
In the 1960s, what was available to the Census Bureau-the number of blacks recorded in the nation's vital statistics and the number counted in the census-became the foundation of an adjustment method to improve the decennial census. But unlike affirmative action, adjusting the census is not per se a race issue. If knowing that someone who rents or is unmarried or has no telephone is a better predictor of whether that person is counted, then that characteristic, not race, should be at the center of a statistical procedure to improve the census. But the census undercount problem has now been racialized, and it is unlikely that any technical effort to correct the undercount will escape this fact (Prewitt 2011) .
CLASSIFICATION: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATISTICAL RACES
Whereas a broad, partisan-based politics has focused on the census undercount, another census characteristic-classification-has been of only sporadic interest, and has been taken up more often by advocacy groups than by the political parties. Despite its ubiquity and its obvious political significance, the classification systems embedded in the census have received little attention from political science.
The state, notes Starr (1992, p. 264 ) is of necessity a category-making enterprise.
Every state must draw lines between kinds of people and types of events when it formulates its criminal and civil laws, levies taxes, allocates benefits, regulates economic transactions, collects statistics, and sets rules for the design of insurance rates and formal selection criteria for jobs, contracts, and university admissions.
The categories adopted for these institutional purposes do not float above society in a "superstructure" of mental life. They are sewn into the fabric of the economy, society, and the state.
In the modern nation-state, the size and distribution of various demographic groupsunemployed, school dropouts, veterans, homeowners, and so on-frame social problems and lead to policy responses. Although these groups exist in society independently of whether they are recorded in the statistical system, they emerge as targets of policy attention largely because they are defined by and counted in official statistics.
Writing about the racial classification in the census, Washington (2004, p. 6 ) has suggested that the study of race "should be directed at the principles which render groups intelligible. It should be directed at the practices through which groups are 'racialized.' And it should be directed at the processes by which, in a variety of different contexts, groups are made, unmade, stratified, or divided." Key to these principles, practices, and processes is how the census defines race groups. American race history is revealed not only through nineteenth-century biological races, twentiethcentury socially constructed races, and twentyfirst-century identity-constructed races. It is also revealed in the races as they appear in the statistical system, and it is these "races" that have particular relevance for political science.
The extensive empirical social science literature on the historic patterns of racial discrimination and exclusion, the mid-twentiethcentury policies to reverse that history with antidiscrimination and inclusive policies, and the continuing focus on disparities in health, education, criminal justice, and employment draw heavily on the classification system in official statistics. To echo Washington, much of what is studied when race is studied is what has been measured statistically. It is in this sense that the nation has statistical races.
The racial classification system in the second half of the nineteenth century, for example, was the site of vigorous political contention over who had claim to citizenship and other civil rights, such as property ownership and marriage. In a detailed treatment by Hochschild et al. (2008) , the census classification was at the center of a traumatic upheaval in the social understanding of what constituted races in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially where to place new immigrants from China and Japan and how to record mixed-race persons.
The wave of immigration starting in the 1960s brought racial classification back onto the political agenda. A Hispanic category was added to what were then the four primary race groups: White, African-American, Asian, and Native American Indian. But Hispanic was not added as a fifth race group; it is a language-based ethnic group, members of which can belong to any of the primary race groups. Multirace also returned to the political agenda. At its core was an old issue-where to classify people who straddle the boundaries of a fixed and rigid taxonomy. Racial classification is always a political exercise in reducing social complexities, and this reduction inevitably encounters instances that don't fit the categories. In the early part of the twentieth century, the one-drop rule forced a fit. First applied in the Jim Crow south but then making its way from state legislature to state legislature, the "black" classification of any person having any black ancestry politically denied the demographic fact of a multiracial population group (Hollinger 2003) . One-drop laws stayed on the books until the 1960s, when they finally became untenable in an America that had officially embraced nondiscriminatory law.
With one-drop thinking rejected by civil rights law, political space had opened for the emergence of a multirace movement. It first made its presence felt in the 1980s, less as a civil rights issue than as a theme in the rapidly expanding discourse associated with multiculturalism and diversity. Local groups were formed to provide support for interracial couples, still suspect in many parts of the country. Although initially formed to provide social support, local groups began to advocate for change in their representation in the census (Williams, 2006) .
In 1992, the Project to Reclassify All Children Equally (Project RACE) was established specifically to challenge the census classification. The white mother of a biracial child framed congressional testimony in terms of self-esteem: "I'm just a mother . . . and whether I like it or not, I realize that self-esteem is directly tied to accurate racial identity . . . . [My] child has been [regarded as] white on the U.S. census, black at school, and multiracial at home, all at the same time" (Williams 2006, p. 43) . The Republican Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, took up the multiracial issue as a political cause, arguing, "America is too big and too diverse to categorize each and every one of us into four rigid racial categories." (Federal
Measures of Race and Ethnicity and the Implications for the 2000 Census 1997, p. 622).
Prominent civil rights organizations feared that a multirace option on the census would dilute their numbers and would weaken racial justice claims. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People argued that the purpose of the census numbers was "the enforcement of civil rights laws" and not "to provide vehicles for self-identification" (Federal Measures of Race and Ethnicity and the Implications for the 2000 Census 1997, p. 308).
Self-identification, however, was exactly what the multiracial advocates wanted. For them, the issue was not social justice but social identity. Their argument that statistics should be a site for choice, expression, and identity has been labeled the "aspirational function" of a census (Mezey 2003 (Mezey , p. 1705 . As Hochschild (2002) observes, it was ironic that the Census Bureau, widely perceived to be a stodgy datacollection agency, was being pushed to be an agent of deconstruction. Perhaps reflecting the fading power of civil rights arguments so compelling 40 years earlier, the multirace argument prevailed, and the 2000 census introduced the "Mark one or more" option in its race question. As a result, there are now 63 possible combinations among the race categories and 126 possible combinations when race is crosstabulated with the Hispanic/non-Hispanic distinction.
It merits note that in this and in other changes it has made in official race statistics, the government carefully distances its decisions from scientific reasoning. The categories, wrote government officials, "should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature . . . . They have been developed in response to needs expressed by both the executive branch and the Congress" (Wallman 1998) .
What were those needs? Although the record of congressional debates and agency deliberation is not explicit, I infer three broad purposes:
1. Racial justice laws needed racial counts. This is most explicit in the implementation of the Voting Rights Act, which uses race statistics to determine whether election districts are biased against minority candidates. More broadly, race statistics point to continuing disparities in education, health, employment, home ownership, income, and incarceration that invite policy intervention. The justification for treating Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders as an independent race in the 1997 revision was explicitly framed in these terms. 2. The multirace option was justified in terms that owe more to identity expression than to racial justice (Williams 2006) . Graham (2002, p. 297) notes that beginning in the 1980s, "immigration strengthened multicultural political currents [and] the ethnoracial pentagon came under attack . . . demand grew for a multiracial option." In the congressional testimony cited above, civil rights organizations argued against the multirace option because, as they saw it, a racial justice purpose was being weakened in favor of a self-expression rationale. When the government sided with the latter, it signaled that classification could have an expressive or symbolic purpose. 3. A third purpose was to capture demographic realities in a society being changed by immigration and racial intermarriage. The multirace option in particular was designed to capture a demographic reality that had long eluded the census, despite the nineteenthcentury adoption of the mulatto category. In modifying the classification in 1997, the government was indicating the importance of racial and ethnic statistics in the larger project of knowing who Americans are as a people.
These three purposes differ politically in important ways. The first, racial justice, is directly tied to government policies and programs. In this instance, racial statistics are instrumental to the broad government goals of equality, fairness, and monitoring discrimination. The second, self-expression, points to a less conventional purpose, though one that in the United States has gained legitimacy within the broad political project of working out the patterns of assimilation, inclusion, and social cohesion in a multicultural society. The third purpose, demographic mapping, is necessary to the two other purposes but reaches beyond them to the less immediately instrumental goal of national selfknowledge.
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS OF COLOR-BLIND PRINCIPLES
It is the first of these three purposes-righting historical wrongs-that has motivated a political challenge to racial classification itself. This challenge, similar to that focused on the undercount, would prevent a particular application of census numbers by altering their production. There are legal as well as political underpinnings to the argument that the nation's statistics should be color-blind. The target is, of course, not statistical measurement but the use of racial data in affirmative action.
The legal reasoning rests on a simple premise. Policy based on a racial classification is morally and constitutionally objectionable irrespective of its purpose. Justice Clarence Thomas has articulated this equivalence principle: "I believe that there is a moral [and] constitutional equivalence between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality . . . . In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple" [Adarand Construction, Inc. v Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) , cited in Haney Lopez 2007, p. 987] . Justice Antonin Scalia has added to this reasoning an anticlassification argument: "the tendency . . . to classify and judge men and women on the basis of their country of origin or the color of their skin" is "fatal to a Nation such as ours" [City of Richmond v. J.A. Corson Co., 488 US 521 (1989) ].
The ballot box has also come into play. In 2003, a third of the voters of California cast a ballot for the Racial Privacy Initiative, or Proposition 54 (California Secretary of State 2003) . If passed, it would have prohibited the state government from using racial classification in most of its business. Proposition 54 owed its place on the ballot to the American Civil Rights Coalition, an organization funded and led by Ward Connerly, a conservative African-American California businessman. With its color-blind initiative the Coalition had hoped to build on an earlier success. In 1996 the Coalition had supported California's Proposition 209, which passed with 54% of the vote. It effectively ended affirmative action in public education, contracting, and employment. Connerly has largely abandoned the effort to eliminate racial classification and counting altogether, but has continued the campaign against affirmative action with successful referenda votes in three additional states (Washington, Michigan, Nebraska) since he pioneered that tactic in California. This is not the place to assess the probable outcome of challenges to affirmative action or the trajectory of the color-blind movement, which I have discussed elsewhere (Prewitt 2011) . We here focus on three broad issues for political science to consider.
First, if, as it should, political science develops a research literature on the official classifications deployed by the state, it will quickly discover that historical context, collective action, and political choice will all come into play. Starr writes, "Historical context is essential because we never start with a bare slate . . . . Categories accumulate. We neither ordinarily think about nor act upon the categories of social life: we act and think within them. At any given time, the legal and other official categories are like geological deposits, with layers of varying age, bearing traces from their period of formation" (Starr 1992, pp. 264-65) . Unlike geological deposits, Starr continues, "social classifications are subject to regrouping and rearrangement as a result of culture and social structure and the collective mobilization of social classes and other interests." This mobilization reflects its historic antecedents and unfolds within the "overall structure of political choice--the system for adjudicating conflicting claims, its rules, presuppositions and organizational form" (Starr 1992, p. 265) . The state is continually editing its version of the society and economy.
Second, although there are many processes through which the state classifies its citizenslaw-making, regulatory action, judicial decisions, mapping and boundary drawing (Scott 1998)-the official statistical system, at least in liberal democracies, is always deeply implicated. This follows from the simple principle that even if the category is made by law or regulatory action-treating doctors differently than dentists, the married differently than the unmarried-policy makers nearly always will need a count of how many fall into which group.
Third, official statistics work though a very large number of population and institutional classifications. I have illustrated the politics of classification using only one of them: the racial/ethnic classification. Alternative classifications in the statistical system-gender, age, occupation, natural resources, industries-each produce their respective politics, but few can rival race classification in the range of significant policy issues affected across more than two centuries of American history: the threefifths rule; the status of free blacks in a slave economy; Jim Crow law; the one-drop rule; racialization of nineteenth-century immigrant groups; restrictive immigration policies in the 1920s; eugenics; integration versus segregation; civil rights policies; affirmative action; diversity and multiculturalism; assimilation debates; the resurgence of color-blind doctrine.
WHAT THE FUTURE MIGHT HOLD
New challenges raise questions about the direction of census taking in the next quarter century. One is rapidly rising costs. The full-cycle budget of the 2010 decennial census, which includes the American Community Survey, will probably exceed $14 billion, more than twice what was required for the 2000 census, which in turn was double the cost of the 1990 census. There are a number of reasons. The households more difficult to count are a steadily increasing proportion of all households in the country. A more demographically complex population produces fresh challenges, requiring, for example, multiple languages for census forms, advertising copy, training materials, and enumerators. The basic unit of data collection-the householdis itself in flux. The child of separated parents may have two households; the retired may have a winter home and a summer home; households shared by college roommates change often as sexual partnerships wax and wane; the household for many elderly is a private bedroom linked to a dining room shared with 20 other residents; addresses and phones are no longer anchored to a place of residence, but move with millions of individuals whose lives are highly mobile. Whatever the reasons, doubling the cost of census taking every decade is not politically sustainable.
One way to control costs is statistical sampling for nonresponse follow-up (Edmonston & Schultz 1995, pp. 75-101) , but politics has clearly ruled that out for now. Another costsaving approach is a national registration system (Edmonston & Schultz 1995, pp. 69-63) . Germany and Holland, for example, no longer conduct an enumeration-based periodic census. Instead they use a registration system combined with other administrative records to regularly update the size and distribution of their populations, and then use that combination as a frame for conducting sample-based surveys on topical issues. In the United States, although a national registration system was under discussion following 9/11, it has now drifted from public attention and is not likely to be actively considered any time soon.
If these two obvious approaches to controlling census costs are not options, what else is available? That question must be considered against the backdrop of declining levels of public cooperation with the census and surveys of any kind. Although the mandatory decennial census should be immune to nonresponse problems, analysis of 2000 census participation indicated it is not. The overall census mailback rate was ∼5% lower than it would have been in the absence of privacy concerns. Second, the differential rate at which the short and long forms were mailed back was 9%, nearly double what it had been in 1990. Third, item nonresponse reached unprecedented levelssignificantly increasing over prior decennials. In the 1990 census, a negligible percentage of the public (1.3%) refused to say how much they paid in rent; nearly 16% left that question blank in 2000. On the always-troubling income question, item nonresponse doubled between 1990 and 2000, from 10% to 20% (Hillygus et al. 2006) . This data deterioration was in part caused by the noisy privacy debate that broke out when the long form reached one in six of America's households. Conservative talk-show hosts had a field day, as did late-night comics. Political leaders weighed in. George W. Bush, who was then a presidential candidate, said if he got the long form he was not so sure he would answer it. The Senate majority leader suggested that Americans not answer census questions if they found them "to be intrusive" (Prewitt 2004) .
The intrusiveness argument matters. At issue was not whether answers would be shared, but whether the questions should be asked. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, confidentiality and privacy can be conceptually distinguished-the difference between them is the difference between "don't tell anyone what I just told you" and "don't even ask." In the lead-up to the 2010 census, Congresswoman Michele Bachmann (Minnesota) has insisted that the only question she will answer on the ten-question form is the number of persons in the household-as this is all the Constitution requires.
If the census and other major government surveys increasingly confront this "leave me alone" stance, the nation's statistical system will of necessity undergo a profound change. Official statistics, as we know them today, come from millions upon millions of boxes being checked, questions being answered, and forms being completed voluntarily by our citizens. There is no statistical system in the absence of this voluntary compliance. A withdrawal of voluntary compliance does not mean that the government (or the economy) will operate without the array of population and establishment data now collected by 70 federal statistical programs and agencies; it means that the current surveybased system, vulnerable to noncompliance and sharp cost increases, will be augmented and maybe eventually replaced by an alternative information system. This alternative "statistical system" might be based on administrative more than survey data and might incorporate commercially available digital information. Does the census have to ask about income if the answer can be found in tax returns, or about home mortgages if the banks have that information, or about distance driven to work if employment records linked to EasyPass data can provide a good estimate? No reader of this article needs reminding of the vast amount of data pouring into various digital systems, nor of the powerful data-mining algorithms being used to extract information from search and swipe data.
Relying on administrative and digital data as a basis for a national statistical system has three troubling features. First, it breaches the firewall that has been erected between administrative and statistical data, based on the principle that our response to a census or survey can never be used against us. Statistical survey data are not about the individual person, but about units for statistical purposes. Administrative data, in contrast, are always about individuals-who is enrolled in school, who will get a social security check, who has been convicted of a crime. Linking the two data types places at risk the protections historically associated with statistical information. Second, it combines government and commercial data, and citizens have far fewer controls over what is being collected commercially and how it is being used. Ironically, public concerns about the intrusiveness of survey questions may lead to a much more intrusive system where there is limited opportunity to say "leave me alone."
The third issue is data quality. Social scientists and statisticians have been steadily improving surveys for three quarters of a century-intensely and productively focusing on everything from sampling theory to question wording. There is a strong network linking official statistical agencies and academic centers that is dedicated to error reduction. Nothing similar is in place for error-prone administrative data. It will take a long time to build such a system; it will be expensive. Even greater challenges face data improvement for commercially collected data. Commercial sites are not likely to welcome a stream of academic conferences on the error rates in their data.
In addition to the formidable and seriously underanalyzed issues addressed throughout this article, this concluding section adds another: If a fundamental shift in the nation's information system is under way (as I believe), what political interests will be mobilized, and what political rules will be invoked?
The empirical social sciences came to maturity in an active and productive interaction with survey data. Survey data are case poor but variable rich. It is very costly to reach the respondent but not to ask multiple questions of him or her. Administrative and especially digital data are case rich but variable poor. Social security records number millions of cases--on earned income, but not much else. Mobile phone records have trillions of data points, but very few variables. What is lost and what is gained in social science theory construction during the shift from variable-rich, case-poor information to its opposite? Computational social science is in its infancy but is already revealing social structures beyond what survey data can reveal. Theorizing about those structures is limited in many ways, not least because public-use data, so familiar to users of federal statistics, is not the practice for proprietary data collected in the private sector, and consequently there is not a robust scientific community (Lazer et al. 2009 ).
Even a slow, modest shift from survey to administrative and digital information sources can have large consequences for society and the study of society. The shift may be neither slow nor modest. The issue is fertile territory for political science.
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